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I structurally estimate an incomplete markets lifecycle model with endogenous labor supply,
using data on the joint distribution of wages, hours and consumption. The model is successful
at matching the evolution of both the ﬁrst and second moments of the data over the lifecycle.
The key challenge for the model is to generate declining inequality in annual hours worked
over the ﬁrst half of the working life, while respecting the constraints imposed by the data on
consumption and wages. I argue that this is a robust feature of the data on lifecycle labor supply
that is strongly at odds with the intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition for labor supply. Allowing
for a realistic degree of involuntary unemployment, coupled with preferences that feature non-
separability in the disutility of the extensive and intensive margins of hours worked, allows the
model to overcome this challenge. The results imply that labor market frictions are important
in jointly accounting for observed cross-sectional inequality in labor supply and consumption
and may have quantitative relevance for analyses that exploit the intra-temporal ﬁrst-order
condition for labor.
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11 Introduction
Can endogenous labor supply choices in the presence of incomplete consumption insurance account
for the patterns of inequality in consumption and hours over the lifecycle? With regards consump-
tion, a large and growing literature has been broadly successful in accounting for both the lifecycle
mean and variance.1 This literature is motivated by two observations. First, lifecycle data on con-
sumption is informative about the nature of risks that households face, and the degree of insurance
that is aﬀorded by ﬁnancial markets or other informal mechanisms.2 Second, consumption is a
direct measure of welfare. Hence understanding how it diﬀers by age and in the cross-section is an
important goal for economic research.
However, the analogous literature has not successfully confronted the data on inequality in labor
supply over the lifecycle. Yet understanding cross-sectional diﬀerences in hours worked is an
equally important research goal, for the same two reasons. First, in addition to being informative
about risk and insurance markets, labor supply data can help in understanding the structure of
labor markets.3 Second, labor supply is also an argument of utility and hence is directly useful
for measuring welfare.4 Thus there remains an important gap in our understanding of lifecycle
inequality.
In models with incomplete consumption insurance and frictionless labor supply decisions, the
diﬃculty in simultaneously accounting for the cross-sectional data on consumption and hours is
due to an inconsistency between the intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition for labor and one of the
most robust lifecycle facts about the distribution of labor supply: hours inequality declines sharply
over the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years in the labor market. I argue that a general feature of this class of
models is that they cannot generate declining inequality in annual hours, while still respecting
the restrictions imposed by the data on wages and consumption.5 Understanding this discrepancy
between model and data is important because it undermines a trade-oﬀ that is at the heart of
the predictions of numerous economic models: equating wages to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and hours. Quantitatively, this inability of standard models to ﬁt the data
holds whether parameters are estimated to match only lifecycle means or whether lifecycle variances
are also explicitly targeted.
In this paper, I structurally estimate an incomplete markets model using data on the joint distri-
bution of both consumption and hours and show that with a small modiﬁcation to the standard
1See for example Deaton and Paxson (1994), Blundell et al. (1994), Attanasio et al. (1999), Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), Storesletten et al. (2004), Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and Aguiar and Hurst (2008).
2See for example Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010).
3For example, in section 4 I show that the increase in mean hours is informative about the tightness of borrowing
limits, and in much of the paper I argue that the variance of hours is informative about the presence of frictions in
the labor market.
4More generally, understanding inequality in hours worked is a ﬁrst step towards understanding inequality in
welfare through data on time use.
5This result applies in a broad class of models. It holds for most reasonable preference formulations and does
not depend on the statistical process governing wages. See section 6 and appendix H for further details. Storesletten
et al. (2001) provide a related argument in a model with complete consumption insurance.
2model, it is possible to account for the key features of the lifecycle data.6 Standard models fail
in this respect because when the data are viewed through the lense of the intra-temporal ﬁrst or-
der condition for labor, there appears to be an idiosyncratic wedge whose cross-sectional variance
declines sharply with age. The key ingredient that generates this feature in my model is invol-
untary unemployment. In the model, involuntary unemployment acts as shocks to individuals’
endowments of time available for work. For such shocks to have an eﬀect on labor supply, some
degree of non-separability between the disutility of the extensive and intensive margins of work is
necessary: individuals care not only about the total number of hours that they work in a given
year, but also about how those hours are spread across periods of employment and unemployment.
This non-separability converts these unemployment shocks into an idiosyncratic wedge in the intra-
temporal ﬁrst-order condition. Since the incidence of unemployment declines sharply with age, the
cross-sectional variance of this wedge also declines with age, generating a wedge with exactly the
property thatis missing from standard models. The extent of the non-separability, along with the
other model parameters, is estimated using simulated method of moments (SMM). Formal tests of
over-identifying restrictions are constructed and are not rejected by the data.
The resulting model shares features with search models in that it emphasizes unemployment and
acknowledges that part of the observed distribution of hours is due to constraints, rather than
choices. But, whereas most search models have little to say about consumption and wealth, my
model is ultimately an incomplete markets models with endogenous labor supply. Hence it can
speak to the data on consumption and wealth, as well as retain an active intensive labor supply
margin, which I show to be important. In the model, some of the cross-sectional dispersion in
annual hours works arises from cross-sectional diﬀerences in choices, while some arises from cross-
sectional diﬀerences in opportunities for work. Both factors contribute to the decline in dispersion
at young ages.
I provide substantial evidence on the distribution of unemployment and hours over the lifecycle
to support the labor supply model that I adopt: I show that the decline in hours inequality is
predominantly residual in nature, i.e, it is not driven by observable characteristics. I show that the
decline takes place both in usual hours worked in a given week as well as in the total number of
weeks worked per year. I show that the decline is a phenomenon that lies exclusively in the bottom
half of the hours distribution. Finally, I show that the fraction of the population who experience
an unemployment spell during the year declines sharply with age, but that the distribution of time
spent unemployed conditional on it being positive, does not vary with age. These last two features
of the data are what disciplines the amount of unemployment risk in the model.
The early literature on lifecycle labor supply focused on rationalizing the hump-shaped proﬁle in
mean hours over the lifecycle and almost exclusively viewed the data through the lens of a risk-
neutral agent, where consumption and earnings are equal.7 This is limiting because not only is it
6The focus of the paper is on residual inequality, i.e. cross-sectional diﬀerences that exist once cross-sectional
diﬀerences in education, race and other observable characteristics have been controlled for. This paper focuses
exclusively on the labor supply of males.
7This literature dates back to Heckman (1974), Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy (1981).
3diﬃcult to speak to data on inequality, it implies that two separate theories are required to under-
stand lifecycle consumption and lifecycle labor supply, neither of which can be held accountable
to the joint restrictions that are imposed by the data. Almost all of the vast literature on labor
market search in a lifecycle setting fall into this category.8
However, there are important reasons for studying the lifecycle distribution of labor supply jointly
with consumption. The trade-oﬀ between consumption smoothing and/or redistribution on one
hand, and the eﬃcient inter-temporal allocation of labor on the other hand, is at the heart of a
number of important economic questions. Salient examples include the design of optimal income
taxation, measuring the welfare implications of changes in technology, and the role of technology
shocks for business cycle ﬂuctuations.9 The few existing models that relax risk neutrality have
either not confronted, or not been able to explain, the declining proﬁle for variance of hours early
in the lifecycle. Two of these papers that warrant further mention are Heathcote et al. (2010a) and
Heathcote et al. (2009). Heathcote et al. (2010a) use a similar model to understand low frequency
time trends in inequality in the USA. That paper does not obtain structural estimates and is not
consistent with the lifecycle data on labor supply. Hence both the goals and methodology are very
diﬀerent from this paper.
Heathcote et al. (2009) does use structural estimation to confront a similar set of facts to what I
study in this paper. However there are two important diﬀerences between the model in Heathcote
et al. (2009) and the model in this paper, both of which are crucial for being able to account for
the lifecycle distribution of hours. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that there is no role for non-contingent
non-human wealth in the partial insurance economy in Heathcote et al. (2009). In this paper,
however, non-human wealth is the key ingredient needed to match the data on mean hours, and
is the main mechanism that allows households to substitute labor supply across time. The second
diﬀerence is that Heathcote et al. (2009) is a perpetual-youth model, rather than a life-cycle model.
Hence there are no horizon or retirement eﬀects, which are the essence of a lifecycle.
This paper is also related to the literature on structural estimation with incomplete markets.10
The current paper goes beyond the scope of this existing work by addressing a wider set of facts
that include information on both consumption and hours. Similarly, there is a parallel literature
on the structural estimation of search models that focuses on estimating parameters of the process
governing labor market outcomes, but ignores consumption. It is the joint restrictions on these
variables that pose the biggest challenge for standard models.
8For a recent example, see Menzio et al. (2010). There are some exceptions: examples of papers that can speak
to the lifecycle data on both consumption and labor supply include Pijoan-Mas (2006), Erosa et al. (2009), Low et al.
(2009) and Lise (2010). However, none of these papers estimates structural parameters from the joint restrictions
imposed by consumption and hours.
9The intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition is at the heart of the economic mechanism in each of these literatures,
thus conforonting this trade-oﬀ with micro data is of ﬁrst-order importance. Examples of its importance include
Heathcote et al. (2010a) for measuring welfare; Heathcote et al. (2010b) for optimal taxation in the Ramsey traditon;
Kocherlakota (2010) for optimal taxation in the Mirlees tradition; and the vast literature on RBC models for business
cycles ﬂuctuations.
10Important related papers in this category include Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Imai and Keane (2004), French
(2005) and Guvenen and Smith (2009).
4Outline of paper In section 2 I outline a benchmark model without involuntary unemployment.
In sections 3 and 4 I then discuss the estimation strategy and shows that the benchmark model is
successful when estimated using only lifecycle means. Section 5 shows that the same model fails
when confronted with data on lifecycle variances, whether or not these are included as estimation
targets. In section 6 I use the FOC for labor to illustrate the sources of this failure. Section 7
provides further evidence on the distribution of hours over the lifecycle, including data on un-
employment spells. In section 8 I discuss ways to incorporate a role for unemployment into the
benchmark model, and in section 9 I show that estimation of the resulting model is successful. In
section 10 I evaluate the ﬁt of the model along some additional dimensions and section 11 con-
cludes. There are many details and sensitivity analyses that need to be addressed in a large-scale
structural estimation such as this. I have relegated many of these details to appendices in an
attempt to improve the ﬂow of information and to communicate better the main points of the
paper.
2 A benchmark model
In this section I describe a standard incomplete markets lifecycle economy, extended to include
a non-trivial labor supply decision. Each household consists of a single worker with a ﬁxed time
endowment. In each year the worker chooses what fraction of his time endowment to work, and
earns an hourly wage equal to his individual labor productivity. Individual labor productivity
follows an exogenous stochastic process.
Demographics The economy is populated with a continuum of households, indexed by i. Agents
work until age Tret, at which time they enter retirement. The unconditional probability of surviving
until age t is denoted by St.11 Households are assumed to have no bequest motive. In order to focus
solely on wage uncertainty, I assume that there exist perfect annuity markets so that households
are completely insured against survival risk. The model period is one year, to be consistent with
the data on labor earnings and total hours worked in the PSID. For simplicity, I do not attempt
to model household size or composition.12
Preferences Households have time-separable expected utility preferences over annual consump-
11I assume that St = 1 for the ﬁrst T
ret  1 periods, so that there is no chance of dying before retirement. After
retirement, St < 1 and all agents die by age T with certainty.
12There is substantial evidence that changes in household composition due to marriage and fertility may play
an important role in determining the evolution of consumption, labor supply and wealth over the lifecycle (see
for example Blundell et al. (1994) or Attanasio et al. (1999)), and that joint labor supply decisions or issues
surrounding intra-household allocations are important (see for example Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) or Attanasio
et al. (2005)). However, rather than attempting to explicitly incorporate such features into the model, I instead
focus on the simplest possible model that can speak to the data and choose an appropriate sample: households
with a male head who is the single primary earner. In appendix C, I compare this sample with alternative choices
and show that none of the main features of inequality are changed. Hence none of the arguments in the paper are
sensitive to this restriction.















In this speciﬁcation  is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and 1= is the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply.13 I allow for ﬁxed heterogeneity in households’ distaste for working relative to
consumption ('i).14
Technology Each household consists of a single worker who can choose to devote a fraction of his
time endowment (normalized to 1) to labor market activities. The worker receives an individual
speciﬁc wage, wit, for each hour worked. Thus annual labor earnings are given by yit = witHit.
Log wages follow an exogenous stochastic process that consists of four components
logwit = t + i + zit + "it
zit = zit 1 + it
t is a non-stochastic experience proﬁle which is assumed to be the same for all individuals in the
economy, i is an individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, zit is an idiosyncratic AR(1) persistent shock and
"it is an idiosyncratic IID shock.15
Asset markets Households can hold quantities of a single risk-free security, ait, that pays interest
at a gross rate R. Holdings can be negative, subject to satisfying an exogenously speciﬁed borrowing
constraint a. Households are born with an initial wealth endowment ai0.16
Government Households face a progressive tax on labor income, given by the function & (y), a
proportional tax on capital income, a and a proportional consumption tax, c: The government also
administers a progressive pay-as-you-go social security system, designed to mimic the redistribution
13For  6= 1 these preferences are not consistent with balanced growth. In particular, with  > 1, they predict
that the fraction of time devoted to labor will fall over time. In my benchmark sample of males, the average fraction
of time spent working decreased by 1 percentage point between 1969 and 2004. None of the main points of the
paper are aﬀected by allowing for preferences that are non-separable between consumption and hours. See section
6 and appendix H for further details.
14It is possible to allow for heterogeneity in any of the parameters of the utility function. However my approach
is to restrict heterogeneity to the minimum amount that is necessary to explain the key features of the data.
Heterogeneity in the disutility of working turns out to be useful in this respect.
15Each component is assumed to be drawn from a discretized normal distribution with zero mean. The variance
of the IID shocks are allowed to vary with age. All other variances are constant across ages. The initial draw of
the persistent component, zi0, is set to zero. The decision to adopt this particular statistical process for wages
is motivated by the fact that it provides an excellent ﬁt to the auto-covariance structure of wages across ages.
Appendix E contains a full description of the wage process, gives further details of the estimation approach and
proves that it is identiﬁed from available panel data on wages. In section 6 I argue that none of the main points of
the paper would be aﬀected by adopting one of the other reasonable statistical processes that has been proposed
in the literature, provided that it is consistent with the lifecycle patterns in the cross-sectional variance of wages in
the data.
16In section 4, I consider two alternatives for determining the tightness of borrowing limits: (i) excluding bor-
rowing all together, a = 0; and (ii) estimating a along with the other parameters of the model. The distribution of
initial assets is calibrated to be consistent with data on the wealth of young households in the PSID.
6implicit in the US social security system. In the model, social security beneﬁts are functions of the
ﬁxed component in wages, i.
Budget constraints The budget constraint for a working age household is hence given by
(1 + c)cit + ai;t+1  R(1   a)ait + witHit   & (witHit)
Hit  1
ai;t+1  a
In retirement there is no labor supply decision. The budget constraints look the same except that
earnings, witHit; are replaced with social security income and the interest rate is adjusted by the
probability of survival to reﬂect the existence of perfect annuity markets.
3 Taking the benchmark model to the data
In this section I describe the most important of the choices that are needed in order to confront
the model with data on wages, consumption and hours. To conserve on space and progress quickly
to the main results of the paper, I refer the reader to appendices for many of the details.
Data sources Data on wages, hours and wealth comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The long panel dimension of the PSID enables estimation of the exogenous stochastic
process for wages in a ﬁrst stage process outside the model. The main limitation of the PSID is
the lack of comprehensive data on consumption. Hence I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), which is a cross-sectional survey, for data on consumption. The CEX also contains data on
earnings and hours, from which I construct joint moments for consumption with hours and wages.
Sample selection In both the PSID and CEX the household is the relevant unit of analysis. I
focus on a sample of households with one primary male earner. This sample is chosen since it most
closely reﬂects the nature of the model described in section 2. I focus on the working life only and
do not attempt to match data on choices during retirement.17
17Full details of each data set, and the selection process, can be found in appendix A. The important features
are as follows. For the PSID, a household is included in the sample if the head is a male aged between 20 and
60 with between 3 and 38 years of potential labor market experience (deﬁned as age - years of education - 6), has
non-missing data on completed years of education, worked between 520 and 5200 annual hours and whose nominal
wage is at least as high as the corresponding minimum wage in that year. I use data from the 1970 to 2005 waves,
covering earnings in 1969 to 2004. For the CEX, a household is included in the sample if it has a male head that
satisﬁes the age, experience, hours and minimum wage criteria described above. In addition the household must
have four completed quarterly interviews. A household is assigned to a given calender year if the fourth interview
took place before April of the following year. I use data from 1980 to 2003. The selection of one primary male
earner is imposed by dropping all household/year observations where the second earner has annual labor earnings
equal to more than half of the head’s annual labor earnings. In appendix C.1 I report ﬁndings from two alternative
samples - one which contains the full sample of households and one which is the complement of the main sample -
married households with two earners. The broad patterns of ﬁrst and second moments of the relevant variables are
similar in these alternative samples. Hence none of the main points of the paper would be aﬀected by using diﬀerent
selection criteria or focusing on a broader sample.
7Variable deﬁnitions Hours are deﬁned as total annual hours of work, constructed as actual weeks
worked multiplied by usual hours worked per week. Labor market earnings are deﬁned as wage
and salary income from all jobs, including bonuses, tips and overtime plus the labor part of income
from self-employment. Wages are constructed as earnings divided by annual hours. For annual
consumption, I use total non-durable expenditures.18 An important consideration in confronting
the model with data on consumption is how to account for diﬀerences in household composition
across households. The choice of whether and how to equivalize household expenditures can have
a potentially large impact on the evolution of the mean and variance of consumption over the
lifecycle. Rather than enter into the debate about which equivalence scale is the most appropriate,
I conduct all the analysis using the OECD-modiﬁed equivalence scale, and refer the reader to
appendix C.5 for a comparison with other reasonable equivalence scales.19
Deﬁnition of lifecycle I use potential labor market experience, deﬁned as age minus years of
education minus six, as a measure of the lifecycle and focus on the range of potential experience
from 3 to 38.20 All major features of the data are unaﬀected by using age, rather than experience,
as the lifecycle variable.21
Measurement error I allow for the possibility that both log hours, log earnings and log consump-
tion are contaminated with classical measurement error. Log wages hence contain measurement
error from both hours and earnings.22
Construction of moments The focus of the paper is on residual inequality: cross-sectional
variation in consumption and labor supply that is not accounted for by ﬁxed individual diﬀerences
in observed characteristics. To extract the residual component of each variable, I run a ﬁrst stage
regression on a full set of experience dummies, four education dummies interacted with either
year or cohort dummies (see below) and race dummies.23 Mean lifecycle proﬁles are constructed
18Appendix C.4 reports how the data is aﬀected by using broader measures of consumption that include expen-
ditures on non-durables or imputed services from non-durables.
19None of the ﬁndings about which features of the model are important for matching the data are aﬀected by the
choice of equivalence scale. However, the resulting parameter estimates would be aﬀected. This is primarily due to
the view one takes about how steep is the rise in consumption inequality over the lifecycle, a feature that is strongly
inﬂuenced by the choice of equivalence scale. There are many diﬀerent views in the literature - see for example
Deaton and Paxson (1994), Slesnick and Ulker (2004), Heathcote et al. (2005), Guvenen (2007) and Primiceri and
Van Rens (2009). A comparison of alternative deﬁnitions of consumption and equivalence scales can be found in
appendix C.5.
20I start at experience level 3 in order to minimize the impact of heterogeneity in the initial transition from
education to the labor market. For example, the model does not include the possibility of gap years, travel,
internships or a long unemployment spell during the initial job search period.
21A comparison of the lifecycle moments using age versus potential experience can be found in appendix C.2.
The reason for using potential experience is to reﬂect the fact that in the model agents are born at the time of entry
into the labor market. Hence there is no distinction between two agents of diﬀerent ages and diﬀerent education
levels with the same number of years of potential experience. Given that it is the accumulation of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks that generate patterns of inequality in the model, the relevant lifecycle dimension on which to
assess the model is potential experience, rather than age.
22When estimating the model using ﬁrst moments only, I use an external estimate of measurement error in wages.
When estimating the model with data also on second moments, I estimate measurement error in earnings and hours
directly, generating an implicit estimate for measurement error in wages. See section 5 for details.
23The reason for focusing on residual inequality is that the model is stationary and does not allow for an education
8as the estimated coeﬃcients on the experience dummies in this regression. Second moments are
constructed using the residuals from this regression.24 All conﬁdence intervals are calculated by
bootstrap.
Year eﬀects vs cohort eﬀects It is well known that an identiﬁcation problem arises when trying
to measure the evolution of variables over the lifecycle: one cannot simultaneously allow for distinct
lifecycle, year and cohort eﬀects in a separable model.25 Rather than enter the debate over whether
it is more appropriate to control for year or cohort eﬀects, I instead repeat all of the analysis twice:
once controlling for cohort eﬀects, once controlling for year eﬀects. For brevity, I report only the
results controlling for year eﬀects in the main text. Analogous results, including all structural
parameter estimates for the cohort view, can be found in appendix I.26
Summary of key empirical patterns The resulting lifecycle proﬁles for the key endogenous
variables are presented and discussed alongside the estimation results in the sections that follow.
Here I summarize the most important empirical patterns.
With regards ﬁrst moments (see Figure 1), there are two important features of the data:
1. Mean log consumption increases roughly linearly during the working years.
2. Mean log hours is inverse U-shaped. There is a sharp increase over the ﬁrst 10 years, then a
ﬂattening and eventually a decrease towards retirement.
With regards second moments (see Figure 2), the important features are:
1. The variance of log consumption increases by less than the variance of log wages. However,
the magnitude of the increase depends on the equivalence scale. For the OECD-modiﬁed
scale the proﬁle is almost ﬂat.
2. The variance of log hours is strongly U-shaped. In particular, there is a sharp downward trend
in cross-sectional inequality in hours worked over the ﬁrst 15 years. This is the most important
fact that I address in this paper. In section 6 I explain why versions of the benchmark model
have diﬃculty in reproducing this downward trend. In section 7 I investigate hours inequality
more thoroughly and show that the U-shaped pattern is extremely robust: it is evident in
other data sets, it is not driven by observable characteristics such as fertility and marriage,
and it is not driven by compositional eﬀects.
decision before entry to the labor market, nor diﬀerential impacts of race on early human capital accumulation. Hence
the model can be expected to explain only the variation in the data that remains after removing variation from
these sources.
24Appendix B contains full details on the construction of the data that is ultimately used for estimation.
25See Hall (1971), Heckman and Robb (1985), Slesnick (2005) and Yang et al. (2008) for alternative approaches
to identiﬁcation.
26None of the main points of the paper are aﬀected. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the estimated parameter
values. The most important of these diﬀerences are a slightly higher estimate for the coeﬃcient of relative risk





94 Successful estimation with ﬁrst moments
The key parameters of the model are identiﬁed using only data on the evolution of mean consump-
tion and mean hours over the lifecycle. In this section I exploit this to obtain parameter estimates
and test the ﬁt of the model with respect to these ﬁrst moments.There are two reasons for starting
by only focusing on ﬁrst moments. First, I want to convey the notion that this model is successful
in terms of matching lifecycle means. Second, I want to illustrate the crucial role of ﬁnancial wealth
in explaining the evolution of mean consumption and labor supply.
Estimation procedure A full description and formal characterization of the estimation procedure
can be found in appendix G. Here I provide only an outline of the key features of the process. I adopt
a simulated method of moments estimator (SMM) with a diagonal approximation to the optimal
weighting matrix.27 The targeted moments are mean residual log hours and log consumption at
36 experience levels (3 to 38). Since it is unreasonable to expect the model to match the level of
consumption (due to the presence of unearned income, and the fact that the data is (a) equivalized
and (b) contains only non-durable expenditures), I normalize mean log consumption to zero at
experience level 3: This generates a total of 71 target moments.
The estimated parameters are the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (), the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity (), the borrowing limit (a) and the degree of cross-sectional variation in the ﬁxed
disutility of working ('i) which is expressed as a coeﬃcient of variation.28 The stochastic process for
individual wages is estimated separately in a ﬁrst stage and then fed into the model.29 Conﬁdence
intervals are constructed by bootstrap to account for the additional estimation error induced by
the ﬁrst stage.
Internally calibrated parameters Two additional constraints are imposed during the estima-
tion. First, I vary the mean disutility of working (E ['i]) so that mean log hours across households
of all experience levels is equal in the model and the data: 44% of the available time endowment.
Second, I impose that the total amount of wealth held by households is consistent with the data.
I do this by varying the discount factor, , to match the 75th percentile of the distribution of
wealth holdings for households entering retirement.30 I do not treat  or E['i] as parameters to
27Using an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix is useful since it permits a simple way to construct tests of
over-identiﬁcation. In similar contexts it has been shown that the optimal weighting matrix may perform poorly in
small samples and that an identity matrix may be preferred. See Altonji and Segal (1996). However in this case it
is not obvious how such an identity matrix should be constructed, since diﬀerent moments are measured in diﬀerent
units. This diﬃculty becomes more apparent when second moments are also included as targets for estimation. The
covariance matrix of target moments is approximated with a bootstrap estimator. Since the oﬀ-diagonal elements
of this covariance matrix are very close to zero and imprecisely estimated, for simplicity I use only the diagonal
elements of the matrix and set all others to zero. See appendix G for details.
28I assume that 'i is drawn from a log-normal distribution. Since the mean is calibrated internally, estimating
the coeﬃcient of variation is equivalent to estimating the variance, but is numerically more stable.
29The parameter estimates and model ﬁt for the stochastic wage process are described in appendix E. The
assumed process provides an excellent ﬁt to the auto-covariance structure of wages over the lifecycle.
30Since wealth is the key feature of the model that allows households to smooth consumption and labor supply
over time, it is crucial that the model implies a distribution of wealth holdings that is consistent with the data.
10be estimated and treat the corresponding targets as non-random quantities.31
Externally calibrated parameters I set the interest rate, R   1, at 3%, the proportional
tax on capital at 40% and the consumption tax at 8%:32 The progressive tax function for labor
earnings is a smooth (diﬀerentiable) approximation to labor income taxes in the US, described
in appendix F.2. The calibration of social security payments is described in appendix F.1.33 I
estimate the distribution of initial wealth, ai0, from the PSID, allowing for a mass at 0 and
lognormal distributions either side of 0: The distribution allows for correlation between the initial
wealth endowment and the ﬁxed component of individual wages (i).34
Estimation with ﬁrst moments The parameter estimates for the model are shown in column
(1) of Table 1 and the ﬁt of the model is displayed in Figure 1. The estimated model ﬁts the
data on mean hours and mean consumption well. The ﬁt is good enough to easily pass a test of
over-identiﬁcation restrictions (p-value = 0:45).
Non-human wealth is crucial Having access to ﬁnancial wealth, and particularly the ability
to borrow at young ages, is the key ingredient of the model that allows it to match the data on
lifecycle means. To illustrate this fact, Figure 1 also shows the ﬁt of the model when the borrowing
limit is set to zero and the parameters are re-estimated (shown in column (2) of Table 1). Without
borrowing, the model is unable to generate an upward sloping proﬁle for mean hours and vastly
overstates the growth in mean consumption. The test of over-identifying restrictions is strongly
rejected (p-value =0.0). The reason is that young households face relatively low wages and hold
relatively small amounts of wealth. Borrowing allows the young to substitute their labor supply to
later periods in life when wages will be higher, yet maintain only moderate consumption growth
by borrowing from their future earnings.
See Storesletten et al. (2004) for a discussion of the importance of matching the wealth level for predictions about
consumption inequality over the lifecycle. Since it is well known that models with idiosyncratic productivity shocks
as the only source of heterogeneity have diﬃculty in matching the upper tail of the wealth distribution, I consider
it more important to target a feature of the distribution that is not too heavily biased by the right tail. Hence I
focus on the 75th percentile at the point where average wealth holdings are greatest. The level of this target is 3:52
times average annual wages.
31An alternative approach would be to include  and E ['i] as two additional parameters to be estimated and to
include these two additional moments as targets. There are two reasons why I prefer to calibrate them. The ﬁrst
reason is computation. These two parameters are uniquely pinned down by the these two moments. Hence simple
nested non-linear equation solvers can be used for calibration. This makes the non-linear optimization process that
is required for the other parameters simpler. The second reason is that by calibrating these parameters, the spirit
of the exercise is clear: How well can the model match the lifecycle means and variances, conditional on being
consistent with overall hours and wealth in the data?
32For the capital tax, I follow Domeij and Heathcote (2004). The consumption tax is based on evidence in
McDaniel (2007).
33Storesletten et al. (2004) showed that a realistic social security system is an important form of insurance over
the lifecycle and is crucial for matching lifecycle data on consumption inequality.
34The estimated wealth distribution matches the cross section distribution of net worth for households with
experience levels 3 to 5. When the model is estimated with the borrowing constraint set to zero, all households are





































Test of over-identifying restrictions
p-value 0.45 0.00 0.00
Calibrated parameters
 0.990 0.988 0.990
E['] 29.4 67.2 30.3
Targeted moments
E[logc] X X X
E[logh] X X X
V[logc] X
V[logh] X
Table 1: Parameter estimates
95% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals in parentheses. Borrowing limit, a, is expressed as a multiple of the average annualized
hourly wage. 2
;y and 2
;h are estimates of classical measurement error in earnings and hours respectively. When not estimated
they are set at 0:01.











(a) Mean log consumption











Target means (no borrowing)
Target means and variances
(b) Mean log hours
Figure 1: Model ﬁt for ﬁrst moments
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Solid dark blue line is ﬁt of model
when only means are targeted. Dash-dot red line is ﬁt of model when only means are targeted and borrowing is not allowed.
Dashed light blue line is ﬁt of model when means and variances are jointly targeted.
5 Second moments: A challenge for the benchmark model
Although the model is able to successfully reproduce the evolution of mean hours and mean con-
sumption over the lifecycle, in this section I argue that the model fails with respect to the second
moments of hours and consumption, regardless of whether these are included as targets for esti-
mation.
Benchmark model ﬁt on second moments The ﬁt of the benchmark model for the variances
of hours and consumption are displayed in Figure 2.35 The model slightly overstates the rise in
consumption inequality over the lifecycle, although the model’s predictions lie within the 95%
conﬁdence bands. However the model fails to generate the sharp decline in the variance of hours
over the ﬁrst 15 years. The reason that the model can generate a small reduction in the hours
inequality over experience levels 3 to 10 is due to heterogeneity in initial wealth. This heterogeneity
generates cross-sectional diﬀerences in the relative strengths of the income and substitution eﬀect
of wage shocks which in turn generates heterogeneity in hours worked. As households accumulate
ﬁnancial wealth for lifecycle and precautionary reasons, the eﬀects of these initial wealth diﬀerences
35In Figure 2, the level of inequality is the same in the data and the model for both consumption and hours. This is
because classical measurement error in consumption and hours is assumed to be responsible for any positive diﬀerence
between the cross-sectional variance in the data compared with the model. This procedure implicitly generates an
estimate of the amount measurement error in hours and consumption. When I extend the estimation exercise to
include the second moments as targets, I explicitly include the variances of measurement error as parameters to be
estimated.











(a) Variance log consumption
















Target means and variances
(b) Variance log hours
Figure 2: Model ﬁt for second moments
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Solid dark blue line is ﬁt of model
when only means are targeted. Dashed light blue line is ﬁt of model when means and variances are jointly targeted.
dissipate. However, this eﬀect is far too small to account for the decline in the data.36
Estimation including second moments as targets Since the model is over-identiﬁed with
data on lifecycle means, it is possible that by re-estimating the model to target all four moments
simultaneously, the ﬁt could be improved. When doing this, I include the variance of measurement
error in earnings, hours and consumption as additional parameters to be estimated. The resulting
parameter estimates are shown in column (3) of Table 1 and the ﬁt of the model is displayed in
Figure 1 (ﬁrst moments) and Figure 2 (second moments). The model ﬁt and parameter estimates
are essentially unchanged from the estimation that used only ﬁrst moments. The test of over-
identifying restrictions is now overwhelmingly rejected (p-value = 0.0). The next section evaluates
the source of this failure.37
36There is also a second contributing factor the small decline in hours inequality at young ages. This is the fact
that the estimated variance of transitory wage shocks is falling at very early on in the lifecycle. See Figure 15 in
appendix E.
37Note that the convexity of the proﬁle for the variance of log hours is far smaller in the model than the data.
This is important since the second derivative of an age proﬁle is always identiﬁed, regardless of which identiﬁcation
scheme for dealing with year / cohort eﬀects one adopts (see Yang et al. (2008)). Hence the ﬁnding that the model
is not consistent with the lifecycle proﬁle of the variance of hours can not be due to the choice of controlling for year
eﬀects, cohort eﬀects or any other possible choices for identiﬁcation.
146 Implications from the ﬁrst order condition for labor
In this section I use the intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition to show that the failure of the bench-
mark model to generate a signiﬁcant decline hours inequality over the ﬁrst half of the working life
is a general shortcoming of this class of models. I then infer that to improve the model in this
dimension a modiﬁcation that generates a labor wedge with declining cross-sectional variance is
required. For ease of exposition I consider the preference speciﬁcation of Section 2. In appendix
H I show that the argument generalizes to other reasonable preferences, including those that allow
for non-separability between consumption and hours.






By taking logs and cross-sectional variances, it is possible to arrive at an expression that relates the
cross-sectional variance of hours worked to moments of the joint distribution of wages, consumption
and preference heterogeneity:
2V (logHit) = V (logwit) + 2V (logcit) + V ('i)
 2COV (logcit;logwit) + 2COV (logcit;log'i) (2)
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences gives the following useful relationship:
2V (logHit) = V (logwit) + 2V (logcit)
 2COV (logcit;logwit) + 2COV (logcit;log'i): (3)
A declining variance of hours at young ages correspond to a negative value for the left hand side
of (3). However in the data, the variance of wages is sharply increasing over the lifecycle while the
variance of consumption is either ﬂat or increasing. Hence the ﬁrst two terms on the right of (3)
are positive.
The covariance between consumption and wages does indeed trend slightly upward over the life-
cycle, so it is possible that a negative component could arise from this term. However, simple
back-of-the-envelope calculations conﬁrm that the increase in COV (cit;wit) in the data is not
nearly large enough to generate the required decline in the variance of log hours. Moreover, to the
extent that V (logcit) > 0, any attempt to amplify the impact of COV (cit;wit) by increasing 
is oﬀset by a larger opposing contribution from the variance of log consumption, for values of 
above 2.
Finally, when borrowing is allowed (which was argued in section 4 to be the necessary ingredient
that is needed to match the lifecycle properties of mean hours) the Euler equation implies that
consumption growth should not co-vary signiﬁcantly with ﬁxed individual characteristics. Hence
15the ﬁnal term in (3) is too close to zero to have any meaningful impact on the variance of hours.38
This argument clariﬁes that the diﬃculty for the model is in simultaneously accounting for inequal-
ity in wages, hours and consumption. It is the joint restrictions implied by this ﬁrst-order condition
that are inconsistent with the lifecycle patterns of inequality in the data. It is important to note
that the exact speciﬁcation of the stochastic process for wages does not aﬀect this conclusion: any
wage process that is consistent with the evolution of the cross-sectional variance of wages over the
lifecycle will suﬀer from this diﬃculty.
An age-varying wedge? One mechanical way to generate a decline in V (logHit) would be to
allow for age-variation in the cross-sectional variance of preference heterogeneity. That is, if one
were to allow for individual-speciﬁc shocks to the disutility of working, 'it, it would be possible
to recover an implied age path for the variance of these shocks that could rationalize the data on
hours inequality.39 One problem with such an approach is that it is hard to think of an underlying
structural motivation for preference shocks whose variance declines with age. In section 7, I argue
empirically that the declining variance of hours is not driven by observable characteristics, so one
could not appeal to marriage, fertility or home ownership as the source of these diﬀerences.
Hence it is clear what type of modiﬁcation is required in order to generate declining inequality
in annual hours: a change that introduces a wedge in the ﬁrst-order condition for labor whose
cross-sectional variance decreases with age. In the sections that follow, I argue that age-varying
labor market frictions, as implied by observed age diﬀerences in job destruction rates, can manifest
themselves as a wedge with exactly this property.
7 In search of an age-varying wedge: unemployment
In this section I delve deeper into the age proﬁle of inequality in hours to show that it is a robust
feature of the data. First, I argue that the declining variance of hours is not driven by of observable
characteristics. Next I show that the decline is present along both the intensive and extensive labor
supply margins. I then move beyond the variance of logs as a measure of inequality and argue that
all of the decline in in inequality occurs in the bottom half of the hours distribution. Finally, I
show that there are important age patterns in weeks spent unemployed during the year that imply
age variation in workers’ ability to freely choose hours of work during the year. Together, these
ﬁndings motivate the extensions to the benchmark model that I explore in the remaining sections.
Controlling for observable characteristics The sharp decline in the variance of annual hours
with age is not driven by the eﬀects of ﬁxed or time-varying observable characteristics. To make this
38Moreover, even if this term were larger, its sign is likely to be positive: agents with a high disutility of working
are likely to be closer to their borrowing constraints and hence will have consumption that more closely tracks wages,
which slopes upward.
39Huggett and Badel (2007) formalize this intuition in a setting with complete markets. They show that with
enough age variation in the structure of preference shocks, it is possible to account for the age patterns in inequality
in wages, hours and consumption.
16point I use data from the Current Population Survey and revert to using age (rather than potential
labor market experience) as the measure of the lifecycle.40 Figure 3a shows the age proﬁle for the
variance of log annual hours in the full CPS sample together with various sub-samples. The ﬁgure
shows that there is a substantial decline in inequality up to the mid-30’s within these sub-groups:
the decline occurs amongst married men, single men, those with children, those without children,
those in the labor force and those who own their own house.
To make this point more formally, Figure 3b shows the results of a standard between-group / within-
group decomposition, where groups are deﬁned based on a rich set of observable characteristics.41
While some of the decline in the ﬁrst few years is due to diﬀerences in observables, the vast
majority of the decline comes from the within-group variance: cross-sectional variation in hours
worked among individuals with similar observable characteristics.
Moreover, the decline in the within-group variance of hours is not due to compositional eﬀects. In
principal, the within-group variance of hours may fall because individuals change in predictable
ways as they get older, with these changes implying lower hours inequality. For example, if the
variance of hours is smaller amongst married men and the fraction of men that are married increases
with age, then this will generate a fall in the overall variance of hours with age. To rule out this
eﬀect, I reconstruct the path of the within-group variance, removing the eﬀect of compositional
changes. The result is displayed in Figure 3c.42 This ﬁgure shows that only around one-third of
the decline in the within-group variance of hours can be explained by this type of compositional
bias.
Extensive vs intensive margins Recall that annual hours are measured as weeks worked per
year multiplied by usual hours worked per week. Hence it is possible to decompose the variance of
log annual hours as
V (logHit) = V (log[usual hours per week]) + V (log[weeks per year])
+2COV (log[usual hours per week];log[weeks per year]) (4)
Figure 3d shows the results of this decomposition. Two interesting facts emerge. First, both
usual hours per week and total weeks per year contribute to the fall in the variance of annual
hours. The relative contribution is roughly 25% from hours per week, 65% from weeks per year
and the remaining 10% from the covariance term. Hence both the extensive and intensive margins
are important for understanding the decline in inequality. Second, the cross-sectional covariance
40The motivation for using the CPS is its substantially larger sample sizes compared with the PSID and CEX.
This allows me to explore changes in the distribution of hours over the lifecycle in more detail. The use of age as
the lifecycle variable is for the sake of clarity only. Details on the CPS and the construction of the relevant variables
can be found in appendix A.
41The decomposition is V (logHit) = EX [V (logHit j X)] + VX [E (logHit j X)]. The ﬁrst term reﬂects the
‘within-group’ variance: cross-sectional variation in hours that exists among individuals with the same X charac-
teristics. The second term reﬂects the ‘between-group’ variance: cross-sectional variation due to diﬀerences in X
characteristics across the population. A group (X) is deﬁned as a cell based on employment, labor force status,
education, marital status, number of children, home ownership and race.
42See appendix D for details on the removal of compositional bias from a within-group variance.






































(b) Within/between group decomposition
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Effect of composition
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(c) Eﬀect of compositional bias
















Usual hours per week
(d) Hours per week vs weeks per year

















(e) 90-50, 50-10 ratios
Figure 3: Features of hours distribution over lifecycle in CPS
See text for description of plots.
18between usual hours per week and weeks per year is positive and does not vary much with age.
This implies that individuals who work fewer weeks of the year also work fewer hours in the weeks
that they are working.43
Beyond variance of logs Until now, I have only considered the variance of logs as a measure
of inequality. Figure 3e displays two alternative measures: the 90-50 ratio and the 50-10 ratio.
A striking feature immediately emerges: the decline in hours inequality over the lifecycle takes
place exclusively in the bottom half of the distribution of hours. Put diﬀerently, inequality is high
for young workers because there are a group of young workers who work far fewer hours than the
median, not because there are many young individuals who work particularly long hours.
Unemployment by age The hypothesis that I pursue as an explanation for the decline in inequal-
ity at the bottom of the hours distribution is age diﬀerences in the incidence of unemployment.
Since the aim is to incorporate the evidence on unemployment into the structural estimation, I
revert to the PSID and focus on the same sample that is used in estimation.44 Since 1970, the
PSID has collected data on the number of weeks spent unemployed in each calender year.45 The
main features of the data are displayed in Figure 4. First, Figure 4a shows that the incidence of
unemployment decreases sharply with age: the fraction of the sample experiencing at least one
week of unemployment during the calender year decreases by 20 percentage points, from around
25% to 5%. Second, Figure 4b shows that conditional on experiencing an unemployment spell dur-
ing the year, the distribution of weeks unemployed is remarkably constant with age. On average
10 weeks are spent in unemployment with a standard deviation of 8.6 weeks.46 In the remainder
of the paper I argue that if unemployment spells are viewed as periods when workers may like to
work but are constrained from doing so, then involuntary unemployment can provide the missing
ingredient that is needed to match the data on hours inequality, both in terms of the extensive and
intensive margins.
8 Modelling unemployment in an annual model
In this section I introduce a role for unemployment shocks into the model of frictionless hours
choices outlined in section 2. Since the vast majority of unemployment spells are much shorter
than one year, a natural way to think about unemployment in an annual model is as reductions in
the available time endowment. In other words, unemployment spells are periods within the year
when the individual is prohibited from working. My approach is to treat unemployment shocks as
43The implied correlation between usual weekly hours and weeks per year is around 0:25.
44Again, this choice is not consequential. None of the facts that I present are speciﬁc to any particular data
source.
45See appendix A for further details on the construction of the weeks unemployed variable.
46These facts are consistent with a job separation rate that declines with age but a job ﬁnding rate that is constant
with age. A number of authors have found evidence for this in other data sets . For example, using data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation, Menzio et al. (2010) document that the unemployment-employment
transition rate is ﬂat with age, and that the employment-unemployment transition rate declines sharply with age.








(a) Fraction with at least 1 week unemployed











St dev weeks unemployed
(b) Distribution of weeks unemployed, conditional on at least
1 week
Figure 4: Weeks unemployed during year from PSID
exogenous reductions in the annual time endowment, where the stochastic process that drives these
reductions is calibrated based on the evidence presented in the section 7. The resulting model is
thus a hybrid between one that treats labor supply as a choice (the frictionless intensive margin)
and a constraint (the frictional extensive margin).47
Shocks to the time endowment Let  hi 2 [0;1] be an individual’s time endowment for employ-
ment in a given year. Thus 1    hi is the fraction of the year spent unemployed. Each individual
can choose to work a fraction hi 2 [0;1] of his available time endowment. Hence annual hours





A natural starting point would be to adopt the preference speciﬁcation
from the benchmark model, where agents have preferences deﬁned over total annual hours, Hi. In










However, modelling preferences in this way has two unappealing features. First, these preferences
imply that agents are indiﬀerent about when in the year they work, and how their annual work
hours are spread across periods of employment and unemployment. For example, a worker with
these preferences would be indiﬀerent between working 42 hours a week for the entire year (42 
47For an alternative approach to modelling intensive and extensive labor supply margins simultaneously, see
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and Prescott et al. (2009).
48Note that individuals are free to choose hi = 0. Hence this formulation includes roles for both involuntary
unemployment
  hi < 1

and voluntary unemployment (hi = 0).
2052 weeks = 2;184 hours) versus working 24 hours a day for only three months of the year (24 
91 days = 2;184 hours). This is clearly counter-intuitive: people do indeed care about how their
work hours are spread throughout a year.
Second, these preferences imply that exogenous reductions in the time endowment will have little or
no eﬀect on the distribution of total hours worked. To see this, recall that the model is calibrated to
match mean annual hours worked across individuals, which is approximately 40% of the available
total time endowment. This means that there are virtually no agents whose hours choices are
constrained by their time endowment. Since no agents are constrained, tightening this constraint
does not have an eﬀect on allocations.
The economics of this implication is that with preferences deﬁned over total hours, a reduction in
the total time endowment eﬀectively allows individuals to choose in which of their annual hours
they will be prevented from working. Since only 40% of available hours are spent working, there is
ample scope to locate these periods of unemployment at times when they would not want to work
anyway.
A richer preference speciﬁcation To generate more realistic implications of reductions in the
time endowment, I consider preferences that display non-separability between time spent unem-










Special cases To understand the implications of these preference, it is easiest to consider four
special cases:
1. When  = 1, preferences are identical to those in (5). Individuals care only about total hours
worked during the year.
2. When  = 1






are the preferences that would arise if one modelled the disutility of working in each employed
week as being separable across weeks within year, with the restriction that hours worked in
each employed week is the same.
3. When  = 0, individuals do not derive disutility from additional periods of employment,
but only from the intensity of hours worked while employed. Hence individuals only care
about hours worked per employed week. One could obtain this preference speciﬁcation by
assuming either that no leisure is enjoyed during unemployment spells, or that leisure during
unemployment spells is separable from hours worked during employment.
4. When  < 0, periods of unemployment generate additional disutility of working, over and
above the additional hours of work required to keep total annual hours constant. This implies
that weeks spent in unemployment increase the disutility of each hour of work even when
21employed. There are a number of ways that one could rationalize this sort of behavior. For
example, in a weekly model of employment, habits in labor supply would lead individuals
who spend more weeks unemployed to work fewer hours in the weeks that they are working.
Similarly, if individuals learn about job termination in advance of stopping work, then it is
reasonable to think that the incentives for them to work long hours in the weeks leading up
to the end of the employment spell are reduced.
These preferences are intended to capture, in a reduced form way, some important features of labor
supply that are missing from (5). First, there are both choice and constraint elements to labor
supply within the year. The utility function (6) can be thought of as an attempt to bridge the gap
between neoclassical models of labor supply that assume that workers are free to choose to work
as many hours as they wish at a given a wage, and frictional models where employment oﬀers are
the result of random outcomes of search eﬀort.49 Some of the observed cross-sectional variation in
hours is due to diﬀerent choices of hours worked across individuals while part is due to diﬀerent
opportunities to work. Second, this model takes seriously the idea that people care about how
their work hours are spread across periods of employment and unemployment.
Impact on V(logH) With unemployment modelled in this way, the ﬁrst order condition for the
choice of hours becomes
witc
 






i acts as an unemployment wedge. Since the incidence of unemployment decreases
strongly with age, the cross-sectional variance of this wedge also decreases with age. It is possible
to derive an analogous expression to (3) for the change in the cross-sectional variance of total hours
worked
2V (logHit) = V (logwit) + 2V (logcit)
 2COV (logcit;logwit) + 2COV (logcit;'i) (8)
+(   1)









where the last two terms reﬂect the additional impact of shocks to the time endowment. With
loose borrowing constraints, the ﬁnal term is close to zero since shocks to the time endowment are
transitory and are thus easily smoothed.
The important term is (   1)





. Its impact on the variance of total hours com-





The second eﬀect stems from inter-temporal non-separability in labor supply. When  = 1; these
two eﬀects exactly oﬀset and there is no impact on the variance of hours worked. When  > 0
there are only partially oﬀsetting changes in intensive hours so that the total eﬀect is positive but
49Note that this model of labor supply has the ﬂavor of a search model in that for some part of the year individuals
may not have an oﬀer to work, and when they do, they are free to either work zero or a positive number of hours.
What the model lacks relative to traditional search models is an option value of waiting - there are no dynamics in
labor supply, other than through the eﬀects of consumption and asset accumulation.
22smaller than the direct eﬀect. When  < 0 there may be ampliﬁcation: a spell of unemployment
reduces hours worked even in employed periods, thus increasing cross-sectional variation in annual
hours by more than the direct eﬀect from cross-sectional diﬀerences in employment opportunities.
When  = 0, this oﬀsetting is just enough so that only the direct eﬀect operates. Hence to generate
additional inequality in annual hours over and above inequality from unemployment it is necessary
to have  < 0.
Allowing for ‘lazy’ types Finally note that if one allows for correlation between the disutility
of work and unemployment shocks, there may be an additional eﬀect. The following extra term is
introduced to (8):




If this covariance is negative, then the intuition is that some people are ‘lazy types’. These indi-
viduals both work less in periods when employed and are more likely to experience unemployment
spells. Since unemployment becomes less likely as individuals age, the contribution of this compo-
nent declines with age. Hence this term has a negative contribution to the overall change in the
variance of annual hours whenever   1: with ‘lazy types’, ampliﬁcation is possible even if   0.
9 Estimation with unemployment shocks
I now embed the model of labor supply with unemployment shocks from section 8 into the incom-
plete markets lifecycle model from section 2. The strategy is to calibrate an exogenous process for
the time endowment from the data on weeks spent unemployed during the year, then repeat the
estimation from section 4 using the richer model. As in section 4, the targeted moments are the
means and variances of log hours and log consumption by potential experience.
Calibration of unemployment shocks I treat unemployment as an exogenous shock that re-
duces the time endowment in a given year. The evidence presented in section 7 showed that all
the age variation in weeks spent unemployed is due to the incidence of an unemployment spell,
rather than in the number of weeks spent unemployed conditional on experiencing an unemploy-
ment spell during the year. Thus I model unemployment shocks as an age-varying probability
of suﬀering a reduction to the time endowment
  hit < 1

, with probabilities taken directly from
Figure 4. Conditional on receiving such a shock,  hit takes on one of two possible values with equal
probability. The two values are set so that the expected reduction in the timing endowment is 20%
with a standard deviation of 17%, consistent with the evidence in Figure 4. I assume that  hit is
distributed independently over time.50
50This assumption may at ﬁrst appear too strong. In the data, the average auto-correlation of log hit is around
0:30. However, the majority of this auto-correlation is driven by ﬁxed unobserved heterogeneity. The corresponding
auto-correlation, controlling for individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, is 0:07 and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Hence the richer model that allows for correlation between unemployment shocks and the disutility of working
implicitly captures this auto-correlation.




































































Test of over-identifying restrictions
p-value 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.00
Calibrated parameters
 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.987
E' 66.4 88.4 115.1 305.0
Targeted moments
E[logc] X X X X
E[logh] X X X X
V[logc] X X X X




Table 2: Parameter estimates with shocks to time endowment
95% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals in parentheses. Borrowing limit, a, is expressed as a multiple of the average annualized
hourly wage. 2
;y and 2
;h are estimates of classical measurement error in earnings and hours respectively. When not
estimated they are set at 0:01. '; h reﬂects correlation between between unemployment shocks and disutility of hours worked,
as described in the text.











(a) Mean log consumption











With unemployment: estimate χ
With unemployment: lazy types
(b) Mean log hours
Figure 5: Model ﬁt for means (with unemployment)
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Solid dark blue line is ﬁt of model
without unemployment shocks. Dash-dot red line is ﬁt of model with unemployment shocks, without correlation between
unemployment and disutility of labor. Dashed light blue line is ﬁt of model with  = 0 and estimated correlation between
unemployment and disutility of labor. All models target means and variances jointly.
Estimating  I start by assuming that  hit is identically distributed across the population and is
independent of the disutility of work 'i. The discussion in section 8 made it clear that in order to
match the data on the variance of hours, a negative value of  is needed. The parameter estimates
in column (1) of Table 2 show that this is indeed the case. The estimated value for  is  0:36,
suggesting that there is a small degree of inter-temporal nonseparability in preferences over hours
worked within the year. Note that  is only slightly negative, so only a small amount of feedback
from unemployment to the intensive hours choice is required to match the data.51 The negative
value implies a positive cross-sectional correlation between the work time endowment and hours
worked during the time when work is available. This is consistent with the evidence presented
in section 7. The ﬁt of the model is displayed in Figure 5 (ﬁrst moments) and Figure 6 (second
moments). In contrast to the model that excluded unemployment shocks the ﬁt of the model is
excellent. The test of over-identifying restrictions is easily passed, with a p-value of 0:28.
Estimating correlation between unemployment disutility of work Some readers may ﬁnd
the idea of a negative value for  unappealing. While there are a number of possible stories that
could be used to micro-found a model with  < 0 (e.g. habits in labor supply, loss of motivation)
51One way to quantify the size of this feedback is to ask by how much a worker would have to reduce his hours in
unemployed periods in order to be indiﬀerent about suﬀering an unemployment spell during the year, holding con-





At the estimated parameter values ( = 2:1,  =  0:36), a 20% reduction in the time endowment generates a re-
duction in hours of 10:1%.











(a) Variance log consumption
















With unemployment: estimate χ
With unemployment: lazy types
(b) Variance log hours
Figure 6: Model ﬁt for variances (with unemployment)
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Solid dark blue line is ﬁt of model
without unemployment shocks. Dash-dot red line is ﬁt of model with unemployment shocks, without correlation between
unemployment and disutility of labor. Dashed light blue line is ﬁt of model with  = 0 and estimated corrleation between
unemployment and disutility of labor. All models target means and variances jointly.
I acknowledge that it may be more attractive to account for the data without appealing to this
feature of the model. One way to achieve this is to allow for correlation between the disutility
of working and the likelihood of experiencing an unemployment shock. This is the story of ’lazy
types’ described in the previous section, and is also consistent with the observed auto-correlation
in weeks unemployed being accounted for by individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
To estimate this version of the model, I ﬁx  = 0, and allow the probability of suﬀering an
unemployment spell to be related to the disutility of working, 'i, using the formula
Pr









where t is the unconditional probability of an unemployment shock at experience t. When  = 0,
the model collapses to the one in the previous section. When  > 0, individuals with above average
values of 'i are more likely to be unemployed. I estimate  along with the other parameters of the
model.
The results of the estimation are displayed in Figures 5 and 6. The estimated value of  is 0:74.
This model also does an excellent job of matching the data on consumption and hours. Again the
test of over-identifying restrictions is easily passed (p-value = 0:26).












Match V(h), V(c), E(h), E(c)
Match Joint Moments Too
(a) Covariance log wages, log hours













(b) Covariance log consumption, log hours











(c) Covariance log wages, log consumption
Figure 7: Model ﬁt for covariances (with unemployment, estimating )
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Solid red line is ﬁt of model when
matching means and variances only. Dash-dot green line is ﬁt of model when matching means, variances an covariances. All
models estimate  and do not allow for correlation between unemployment and disutility of labor.
10 Further evaluation of the model
The focus of this paper has been on developing a theory that can simultaneously account for the
lifecycle means and variances of consumption and labor supply. To this end, the model presented
in section 9 is largely successful.
However, as is true with all models, the model with unemployment shocks cannot be consistent
with all aspects of the data. So in this section I evaluate the ﬁt of the model along some additional
dimensions. There are two natural starting points. First, I consider the remaining second moments:
covariances between wages, hours and consumption. Second, I examine the key elements of the
evolution of the wealth distribution over the lifecycle.
Fit of covariances The ﬁt of the model for the joint second moments of wages, hours and
consumption is shown in Figure 7.52 The model is successful in generating the broad pattern of a
negative and downward sloped covariance between wages and hours. The reason is that with the
estimated inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1
 < 1, the income eﬀect of hours responses to
wage changes is negative. Agents face two types of wage shocks in the model. There is little or
no income eﬀect associated with transitory shocks. Hence hours co-vary positively with transitory
shocks due to the substitution eﬀect. Persistent shocks, however, do generate an income eﬀect,
and hence co-vary negatively with wages. As households age, persistent shocks account for an
increasing fraction of the overall cross-sectional variance of wages. This generates a declining
covariance between log wages and log hours in the model.
The model is less successful at matching the covariances of wages and hours with consumption.
The model predicts a counter-factually negative covariance between hours and consumption, and
52The ﬁgures show the ﬁt for the model that estimates . Along these dimensions, the ﬁt of the ‘lazy types’
model is extremely similar. Results are available from the author on request.
27overstates the rise in the covariance between wages and consumption.
These shortcomings can be mostly overcome by re-estimating the model to target the three covari-
ances, in addition to the mean and variance of consumption and hours.53 The parameter estimates
are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 and the ﬁt is displayed in Figure 7. Although the
re-estimated model fails the test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value = 0.00), the ﬁt of the three
covariances is substantially improved and the model is is broadly consistent with all features of the
joint distribution of wages, hours and consumption up to second moments.54
Fit of wealth distribution The accumulation of non-human wealth for lifecycle and precaution-
ary reasons is the key feature of the model that generates a dynamic aspect to labor supply choices
and diﬀering consumption choices for households of diﬀerent ages.55 It is hence important that
the model is consistent with the main features of the evolution of wealth over the lifecycle. The
ﬁt of the model with regards the wealth distribution is displayed in Figure 8. The key features are
matched well: a declining fraction of the population with non-positive wealth, a declining proﬁle
for the variance of log wealth and a covariance between log wages and log wealth that is positive
at all experience levels, increasing during the ﬁrst half of the working life and ﬂat in the second
half.
11 Concluding remarks
I have showed that an estimated lifecycle economy with incomplete consumption insurance and
endogenous labor supply can succesfully account for the observed joint distribution of consumption,
wages and hours in US data. I argued that the intra-temporal ﬁrst-order condition for labor places
very strong restrictions on how this distribution evolves over the lifecycle, that are inconsistent with
the observed decline in hours inequality over the ﬁrst half of the working life. These restrictions
are so strong, that in order to ﬁt the data, some modiﬁcation to the standard model is needed.
The modiﬁcation that is required is one that generates an idiosyncratic labor wedge whose cross-
sectional variance declines with age.
I modify the standard model to allow for the possibility of involuntary unemployment, which acts
as shocks to the endowment of time available for work. For these shocks to generate a labor wedge
with the desired cross-sectional properties, the model requires some degree of non-separability in
the disutility of hours worked at the extensive and intensive margins within a year: in the model,
agents care about how their annual work hours are spread across periods of employment and
53Recall that the model is still over-identiﬁed when targeting the means and variances, and passes the test of
over-identifying restrictions. Hence there is scope for an alternative parameter conﬁguration to also match the three
covariances.
54Inspection of Figure 7c reveals why the model still fails the formal test of over-identifying restriction: the
required increase in the covariance between wages and consumption that is required to match the other moments is
too large in the model compared with the data.
55Non-human wealth is also a key feature of the model that diﬀerentiates this paper from those that have studied
labor supply in partial insurance economics, such as Heathcote et al. (2009).
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With unemployment: lazy types
(a) Fraction with negative or zero assets











(b) Variance log wealth










(c) Covariance log wealth, log wages











(d) Covariance log wealth, log hours
Figure 8: Model ﬁt for wealth distribution (with unemployment)
Thick dashed black line is data. Thin dotted black line is 95% conﬁdence interval for data. Dash-dot red line is ﬁt of model
with unemployment shocks, without correlation between unemployment and disutility of labor. Dashed light blue line is ﬁt
of model with  = 0 and estimated correlation between unemployment and disutility of labor. All models target means and
variances jointly.
29unemployment. Thus the model generates inequality in annual hours worked that is partly due
to diﬀerences across households in opportunities to work, and partly due to diﬀerences in optimal
labor supply decisions.
When the degree of unemployment risk is calibrated to be consistent with PSID data on unem-
ployment spells, the estimated model matches the age proﬁles of the ﬁrst and second moments of
consumption, hours and wages.
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33A Data sources
A.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
Data source The PSID has been conducted annually from 1968 to 1997 and bi-annually since 1997. I
use data from the 1970 to 2005 waves. Questions about labor income and work hours refer to the previous
calender year. Thus the 1970 to 1997 waves contain data on earnings in 1969 to 1996, and the 1999 to
2005 waves contain bi-annual data on earnings from 1998 to 2004. I do not use the the 1968 or 1969 waves
because data on weeks spent unemployed only became available in the 1970 wave.
The PSID data is released in two stages: an early release ﬁle with variables named ERxxxxx, and a ﬁnal
release ﬁle with variables named Vxxxx. The ﬁnal release ﬁle contains data that has been subject to more
stringent cleaning and checking processes and contains a number of constructed variables (e.g., total annual
labor income of the head and wife). From 1994 on the ﬁnal release ﬁles have not been made available.
Instead, clean variables for labor income, annual hours and several other variables, are available in the
Family Income-Plus Files and Hours of Work and Wage Files. I restrict attention to the core (SRC)
sub-sample. This selection is imposed by retaining only those households with identiﬁers of 3000 or below.
Top-coding From 1968 I deal with top-coded observations by assuming the underlying distribution for
each component of income is Pareto, and by forecasting the mean value for top-coded observations by
extrapolating a Pareto density ﬁtted to the non-top-coded upper end of the observed distribution.
Variable deﬁnitions Annual earnings of the household head includes all income from wages, salaries,
commissions, bonuses, overtime and the labor part of self-employment income. The PSID splits self-
employment income into asset and labor components using a 50-50 rule. Annual hours of work are deﬁned
as the sum of annual hours worked on the main job, on extra jobs, plus annual hours of overtime. It
is computed by the PSID using information on usual hours worked per week and the number of actual
weeks worked in the last year. Hourly wages are constructed as annual earnings divided by annual hours.
Weeks unemployed are deﬁned as the number of weeks of worked that were missed due to unemployment
of temporary layoﬀ.
Wealth data The most reliable source for data on wealth inequality is the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). However in order to avoid the use of a fourth data source and to maintain a sample that is consistent
with the one used for data on consumption, hours and wages, I use wealth data from a supplemental
questionnaire in the PSID that was administered to a sub-sample of the panel in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999,
2001, 2003 and 2005. Moreover the use of PSID allows for the inclusion of evidence on the covariance of
wealth with wages and hours over the lifecycle, for which the model provides strong predictions. I deﬁne
wealth as total net worth of a household. Although the model features only a single risk-free asset with
which households can save, the use of total wealth, which includes elements such as housing and other
non-liquid assets, is justiﬁed on two grounds. First, it is likely that almost all assets held by households can
be liquidated within a year. Since the model period is annual, this is consistent with including seemingly
non-liquid assets in the deﬁnition of wealth. Second, running down assets to smooth the eﬀects of wage
shocks in the model can be thought of in terms of borrowing against collateralizable assets in the real world.
Selection criteria A household is retained in the sample in every year that it satisﬁes all of the selection
criteria. Thus households may drop in and out of the sample. The following selection criteria are imposed.
(1) retain only SRC sample; (2) keep only heads of households; (3) keep only males; (4) drop observations
with missing data on years of education; (5) drop 1968 and 1969 waves; (5) keep only individuals aged
between 20 and 60; (6) keep only individuals with between 3 and 38 years of potential labor market
experience; (7) drop households with a second earner who earned at least half the amount earned by the
male head - this is the single primary earner assumption discussed in the main text; (8) keep only individuals
who worked between 520 and 5200 hours during the calender year; (9) drop observations where the nominal
wage is less than half the corresponding minimum wage for that year; (10) drop 13 observations with
nominal earnings greater than $1;000;000. The ﬁnal sample contains 46;369 individual-year observations
34PSID PSID CEX
Observations Unique Households Observations
PSID SRC, 1968-2005 221,520 16,920
CEX, 1980-2003 458,680
Heads of households (87,262) (4,749)
Males (31,328) (3,876)
Less than 4 interviews (179,416)
Missing years ed (1,153) (442) (29,037)
PSID 68, 69 waves (4,318) (367)
Age (17,403) (582) (65,111)
Experience (5,904) (261) (12,614)
One primary earner (26,744) (1136) (81,997)
Only 5th quarterly interview (68,034)
Hours (634) (29) (555)
Min wage (392) (9) (174)
Earnings > 1m (13) (0) (0)
Final sample 46,369 5,469 21,742
Table 3: Number of observations lost at each stage of the selection process
and 5;469 distinct individuals. Table 3 shows the number of observations and individuals lost at each stage
of the selection process.
A.2 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
Data source and selection The CEX sample is drawn from the 1980 to 2003 waves and comes from
Krueger and Perri (2006). I include only households that were interviewed for four consecutive quarters.
Following Krueger and Perri (2006), I assign a household to a survey year if the fourth interview took place
before April of the following year. I deﬁne the head as the CEX reference person if he is a male and as
the spouse if the the CEX reference person is female and the head is a spouse. This is for consistency with
the PSID in which the male is always referred to as the head in male/female couples. Table 3 shows the
number of observations and individuals lost at each stage of the selection process.
Variable deﬁnitions The deﬁnition of non-durable consumption expenditures is discussed in appendix
C.4. This is the same deﬁnition as used in Krueger and Perri (2006). I refer the reader to that paper for
further details.
A.3 Comparability of CEX and PSID samples
Figure 9 shows a comparison of the lifecycle properties of the joint distribution of wages and hours in the
two data sets. Both the level and shape of the variance of wages and hours are remarkably similar in the
two samples. The wage-hours correlation is negative in the PSID with a slight decrease, while it is positive
in the CEX and relatively ﬂat.












(a) Variance log wage











(b) Variance log hours











(c) Covariance log wages, log hours
Figure 9: Comparison of wage / hours distribution in CEX and PSID
A.4 Current Population Survey (CPS)
CPS data is used for the analysis of the distribution of hours over the lifecycle in section 7. My CPS sample
is from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (http://cps.ipums.org/cps/) collection of
the March Outgoing Rotation Group surveys. IPUMS creates a set of individual-level and household-level
sample weights. I use the individual weights in all calculations. The key variables that are used are usual
hours worked per week last year (UHRSWORK) and actual weeks worked last year (WKSWORK1). From
these variables I construct a measure of annual hours worked. I use data from the 1976 to 2008 surveys.
For the analysis in section 7, the only selection criterion that I impose is to restrict attention to males.
B Construction of moments
Let z1
it and z2
it be observations on two variables for household i with potential labor market experience
t. These variables may be log wages, log annual hours or log equivalized household consumption. The
covariance between any two of these variables at each t can be split into a component due to observable






















In this paper I am concerned with properties of the second, residual, component. The residual component

















it = zit   E [z j Xit;t].
First moments The set of variables contained in Xit is assumed to be the current year, education and
race. Note that this implies that the information set deﬁned by (Xit;t) also implicitly includes age and
cohort (year of birth). I construct an estimate ^ "z
it of "z
it as the residual from a regression of zit on a full
set of experience dummies, three race dummies and four education dummies interacted with either year or
cohort dummies. Mean lifecycle proﬁles are those described by the coeﬃcients on the experience dummies
in this regression. For future reference in appendix G, I note that it is possible to write these coeﬃcients
in the form of a moment, E [~ zit j t] where ~ zit is a linear function of (zit;Xit). For data on consumption I
focus only on E [~ zit j t]   E [~ zit j 3].















it . The moment deﬁned in (10) can be written as E [xit j t].









^ xit ! E [xit j t]: (11)
nx;t refers to the number of observations of variables
 
z1;z2
at experience level t.
The data plotted in Figures (2), (6) and (7) refers to ax;t
n modiﬁed to control for year eﬀects (see below).
The conﬁdence intervals are constructed by bootstrap with 250 bootstrap repetitions. For moments derived
from PSID data, the bootstrap is clustered by individual, to account for the fact that the PSID follows the
same people over time so consecutive observations may not be independent. For moments derived from the
CEX, the bootstrap is stratiﬁed by experience level. Since the CEX is a cross-sectional survey, clustering
is not required. The conﬁdence intervals account for additional estimation error induced by the use of
residuals from the ﬁrst stage regression.
This description has not explained how identiﬁcation assumptions for dealing with age, year and cohort
eﬀects are imposed. Appendix C.3 below describes how this procedure is modiﬁed to allow for year or
cohort eﬀects in the second moments, by re-weighting the summation term in (11).
C Alternative empirical choices
C.1 Selection of single earner households
Figure 10 compares the lifecycle proﬁles of the ﬁrst and second moments of log wages, log hours and log
consumption across three diﬀerent samples. The sample labelled ‘Single’ is the sample adopted as the
baseline sample in the main text: households with either a single male earner or where the second earner
earns less than half the earnings of the primary earner. The sample labelled ‘Married’ is the complement
of the ‘Single’ sample: households with two earners. The sample labelled ‘Full’ is the combined sample.
Along all dimensions, the lifecycle proﬁles have essentially the same shape. Thus none of the structural
parameter estimates or economic implications are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by this choice.
C.2 Deﬁnition of lifecycle
For the reasons discussed in Section 3, in the main body of the paper I focus on potential labor market
experience (age minus years of education minus six) as the variable that deﬁnes the lifecycle. In this
appendix I provide evidence that none of the main results of the paper would have been aﬀected had I
instead used age to deﬁne the lifecycle. Figure 11 compares the lifecycle proﬁles of the ﬁrst and second
moments of log wages, log hours and log consumption across these two deﬁnitions of the lifecycle. As
before, potential labor market experience is plotted between 3 and 38, resulting in 36 data points. To
enable comparison across the two approaches, age is plotted between 22 and 57, which also generates 36
data points. All ﬁgures are generated from the same underlying sample of observations. The two sets of
plots diﬀer only in how they assign observations to points in the lifecycle. For the sake of clarity, the plots
based on age are with respect to an x-axis that corresponds to age-19. Figure 11 shows clearly that all the
lifecycle proﬁles are extremely similar, regardless of which deﬁnition is adoption.
C.3 Controlling for year / cohort eﬀects
Consider a squared residual variable xit as deﬁned in appendix B. Recall that t refers to potential labor
market experience (the ‘age’ variable) and that xit is unaﬀected by whether the conditional means in the ﬁrst
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(b) Mean log hours
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(d) Variance log wage
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(g) Covariance log wage, log hours












(h) Covariance log hours, log consumption











(i) Covariance log wages, log consumption
Figure 10: Sensitivity of lifecycle proﬁles to selection of households with a single primary earner
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(d) Variance log wage
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(f) Variance log consumption










Experience, or Age Minus 19
(g) Covariance log wage, log hours
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(h) Covariance log hours, log consumption
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(i) Covariance log wages, log consumption
Figure 11: Sensitivity of lifecycle proﬁles to the deﬁnition of the lifecycle: age vs potential experi-
ence
39stage are based on year or cohort, since together with education and age each partitions the observations
in the same way. Let y refer to year and k refer to cohort. By constuction k = y   t.
In every (t;y) cell (or equivalently (t;k)), a conditional moment of xit can be computed, E [x j t;y] =
E [x j t;k]. This is a two-dimensional function. Now, since the model is stationary, it does not distinguish
between comparisons across ages that hold cohorts (k) ﬁxed and comparisons that hold years (y) ﬁxed.
But since the world is non-stationary, these two comparisons are indeed diﬀerent in the data. In order to
confront the model with the data, it is necessary to project the two-dimensional function E [x j t;y] onto a
one-dimnensional sub-space to generate the function E [x j t]. The essence of the identiﬁcation problem is
that there are many ways to do this projection. I consider two such projections.
The ﬁrst approach, which I call ‘time eﬀects’, computes E [x j t] as





E [x j t;y]
where Y is the number of years for which there is data. This approach weights the conditional moments
in each year equally. This is equivalent to studying the coeﬃcients on the age eﬀects in a separable model
with a full set of dummy variables for age and years.
The second approach, which I call ‘cohort eﬀects’, computes E [x j t] as





E [x j t;k]
where K (t) is the number of cohorts in the sample of individuals with experience level t. This approach
weights the conditional moments from each cohort equally.
To estimate these moments, I appeal to a law of large numbers and replace expectations with sample
averages. This implies that each each formulation can be expressed as re-weighting version of the sum in
(11):




















where N (t;y) = N (t;k) is the number of observations on x from individuals with experience level t in year
y of cohort k = y   t.
I also consider a third approach, which I call ‘raw’, that estimates E [x j t] as








This is the estimate that would results from taking the sample average of xit at each t: Note that because
the CEX and the PSID are random sample with respect to age, they have the property that N (t;y)  nx;t.
Hence the ‘time eﬀects’ approach and the ‘raw’ approach will give very similar results.
Figure 12 displays the lifecycle proﬁles of the ﬁrst and second moments of log wages, log consumption and
log hours for the three diﬀerent weighting functions. The dashed black lines corresponds to the ‘time eﬀects’
approach. This is the data that is used in the main body of the paper. The solid blue line corresponds to
the ‘cohort eﬀects’ approach. The dotted red line reports the ‘raw’ approach.












(a) Mean log wage

















(b) Mean log hours











(c) Mean log consumption












(d) Variance log wage










(e) Variance log hours












(f) Variance log consumption









(g) Covariance log wage, log hours












(h) Covariance log hours, log consumption









(i) Covariance log wages, log consumption
Figure 12: Sensitivity of lifecycle proﬁles to choice to normalization for cohort and year eﬀects
















Non−durables plus services from durables
Total expenditure
(a) Mean log consumption












(b) Variance log consumption
Figure 13: Sensitivity of consumption proﬁles to consumption deﬁnition
Of these lifecycle proﬁles, only three are sensitive to the choice of normalization: (1) mean wages; (2) mean
consumption; and (3) variance of wages over the ﬁnal 10 years. All other moments look almost identical,
regardless of whether one takes a cohort view or year view of the data. Importantly, all of the moments
that are needed for the arguments in section 6 regarding the failure of the benchmark model to generate
declining inequality in hours at young ages are not aﬀected by this choice.
C.4 Consumption deﬁnition
In this appendix I examine the sensitivity of the lifecycle proﬁles of consumption to alternative deﬁnitions
of consumption. In the main body of the paper I focus on non-durable expenditures only. I adopt the
deﬁnition used by Krueger and Perri (2006). This includes food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, personal
care, fuels, utilities and public services, household operations, public transportation, gasoline and motor
oil, apparel, education, reading, health services and miscellaneous expenditures. Figure 13 compares the
the consumption proﬁles using this deﬁnition to two other broader deﬁnitions.
The ﬁrst alternative deﬁnition, which I label ‘non-durables plus services from durables’ adds entertainment,
household equipment, other lodging expenses, other vehicle expenses, rented dwellings, imputed services
from owned primary residence and imputed services from vehicles. The second alternative deﬁnition, which I
label ‘total expenditure’ replaces the imputed services with purchases of dwellings and purchases of vehicles.
Figure 13 shows that including imputed services from durables has no noticeable eﬀect on the rise in mean
consumption over the lifecycle, and has almost no eﬀect on the level or shape of the variance of consumption
over the lifecycle. However, including housing and vehicle purchases does have an eﬀect: this generates a
steeper rise in mean consumption and a higher cross-sectional variance of consumption at all ages.
C.5 Choice of equivalence scale
Figure 14 shows that the lifecycle proﬁle for both the mean and variance of log consumption is sensitive to
the choice of household equivalence scales. The deﬁnitions of the various equivalence scales are as follows.








(a) Mean log consumption





















(b) Variance log consumption
Figure 14: Sensitivity of consumption proﬁles to equivalence scale
Deaton-Paxson This is the equivalence scale used in Deaton and Paxson (1994). It assigns 1 for each
adult in the household and 0:5 for each child.
Slesnick-Ulker This is the equivalence scale used in Slesnick and Ulker (2004). It is equal to the square
root of the Deaton-Paxson scale.
OECD This scale, also known as the ‘Oxford Scale’, assigns 1 to the ﬁrst household member, 0:7 to each
additional adult and 0:5 to each additional child.
OECD-modiﬁed This scale, ﬁrst proposed by Hagenaars et al. (1994), assigns 1 to the ﬁrst household
member, 0:5 to each additional adult and 0:3 to each additional child.
Square root This scale is equal to the square root of the number of household members, regardless of age.
There does not seem to be a consensus about which is the best equivalence scale to use. Each of these ﬁve
scales has been used in parts of the literature.
D Composition eﬀects in hours variance
In this appendix I describe the procedure used to construct Figures 3b and 3c. For any random variable
Y , we can decompose its variance, V (Y ), into within-group and between-group components, where groups
are deﬁne by the variable X:
V (Y ) = VX [E (Y j X)] + EX [V (Y j X)] (12)
The second term in (12) is the within-group variance. Denote its value at age t, by V W
t (Y ). The change
in V W
t (Y ) can be further decomposed as
V W




t (Y j X)dFt (X) +

X
Vt 1 (Y j X)dFt (X): (13)
43The ﬁrst term in (13) is the true change in the within-group variance: the change that would occur if
the distribution of conditioning variables (X) stayed constant with age. The second term in (13) is the
composition eﬀect: the change that is due to diﬀerences in the distribution of X with age.
To construct the path for V w
t (Y ) net of the composition eﬀect, I reconstruct the sequence of V W
t (Y ),
using only the ﬁrst term in (13). The set of X variables that I consider is discrete - it includes employment
status, labor force status, education status, marital status, number of children, home ownership and race.
In each cell deﬁned by these variables, I ﬁrst construct an estimate of Vt 1 (Y j X). I then estimate the
second term in (13) as the diﬀerence between the expectation of this variance over X using the age t and
age t   1 distributions of X. The ﬁrst term in (13) is then obtained as a residual.
E Wage process
E.1 Identiﬁcation of parameters
Let !it be the estimated log wage residual from the ﬁrst-stage regression i.e !it  "w
it. The benchmark
speciﬁcation for the statistical process governing !it is
!it = t + i + zit + "it
zit = zit 1 + it
zi0 = 0
where E ["it] = E [it] = E [i] = 0 and V [it] = , V ["it] = "t and V [i] = . Denote an element
of the auto-covariance function of !it as t;t+j  COV (!i;t;!i;t+j). The auto-covariance function for this
process is then given by
tt =  +
1   2t
1   2  + "t
ts =  + (s t)1   2t
1   2  for s > t
Assume that !it is observed for t = 1;T with T  4. The following subset of the available moment




13   12 = (   1)
12 =  + 
Given identiﬁcation of these parameters, f"tg
T
t=1 is identiﬁed from fttg
T
t=1. The deterministic earnings
proﬁle is identiﬁed directly from E [!it j t].
E.2 Estimation of wage process
To estimate the wage process I ﬁrst construct the empirical analogue of the auto-covariance function by
year. That is, I construct an estimate of the auto-covariances COV (!i;t;!i;t j) in each experience / year
cell. Note that since experience / year and experience / cohort partition the experience / cohort / year
space in exactly the same way, it is irrelevant whether this is done in terms of year or cohort. Note also
that, given the wage process does not have year or cohort eﬀects, it is not strictly necessary to construct
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Table 4: Parameter estimates
auto covariance functions for each year. However, it has no impact on the estimation, yet it permits me
to compare my estimates with what would have obtained if I had allowed for year or cohort eﬀects in the
variances of the wage shocks. I use a maximum of 25 lags in each cell and only retain moments that were
constructed with at least 30 observations. The results are not sensitive to alternative choices for either of
these values.
I parametrize the age eﬀects in the transitory variance using a quartic polynomial. This turns out to be
ﬂexible enough to match the age patterns in the auto-covariance function well.
The parameters are estimated using generalized method of moments with a weighting matrix given by n  1
2,
where n is the number of observations used in the construction of each corresponding sample moment.
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrap with 250 repetitions.
The parameter estimates from the benchmark speciﬁcation are reported in Table 4. The ﬁt of the wage
model is displayed in Figure 15 for the model with year eﬀects. The model with cohort eﬀects generates
almost identical ﬁgures. Figures 15a and 15b show that the model provides a good ﬁt to the the variance
of wages over the lifecycle and the average auto-covariance function. The estimated experience eﬀects in
the transitory variance of wages are displayed in Figure 15c and a decomposition of the variance of wages
into its various components can be found in Figure 15d.
E.3 Alternate speciﬁcations
I have also considered numerous modiﬁcations to the baseline speciﬁcation. These include not allowing for
age eﬀects in the transitory variance; allowing for time eﬀects in the transitory and persistent variances as
well as the ‘price’ of the ﬁxed eﬀect; allowing for proﬁle heterogeneity in the manner advocated by Guvenen
(2009); using alternative weighting matrices and diﬀerent sets of lags for the targeted auto-covariance matrix;
using alternative sample choices and year/experience restrictions. The number of possible formulations are
far too numerous to report. Table 4 reports estimates that allow for year eﬀects in the variances of the
persistent and transitory shocks, rather than age eﬀects in the transitory shocks. None of the parameter
estimates are signiﬁcantly aﬀected. All other results are available from the author on request.















(a) Variance of log wages by age












(b) Average auto-covariance function











(c) Estimated experience eﬀects in transitory wage shocks














(d) Decomposition of wage variance
Figure 15: Model ﬁt for estimated wage process (year eﬀects)
46F Further details of the model
F.1 Social security system and calibration
Pension beneﬁts are calibrated to approximate the redistribution implicit in the US social security system.
In the US, social security beneﬁts are a function of average qualifying earnings over the highest 30 years.
In the model, I approximate average earnings by using a function of the ﬁxed component of wages. In a
previous version of the paper I allowed pension beneﬁts to also vary with the ﬁnal persistent component
of wages. However, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, that formulation made pension wealth overly
sensitive to wage realizations in the last few working years, which is the opposite of what happens in reality.
The approximation that I impose assumes that agents work average hours in every year and earn average
wages conditional on their ﬁxed eﬀect in every year.
To match the progressivity of the US social security system, I specify that beneﬁts are equal to 90% of
approximated average earnings up to a given bend point, 32% from this ﬁrst bend point to a second bend
point, and 15% beyond that. The two bend points are set at, respectively, 0.18 and 1.10 times cross-
sectional average gross earnings, based on US legislation and individual earnings data for 1990. Beneﬁts
are then scaled proportionately so that a worker earning average labor income each year is entitled to a
replacement rate of 34%. In October 2009, average social security beneﬁts for those aged 65 years and older
was $12;938, while average labor income was $41;335. This implies an average replacement rate of 34%.
See http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/.
F.2 Progressive labor income taxes and calibration
I assume the following functional form for labor income taxes




This speciﬁcation implies that one minus the marginal tax rate is given by
1   &0 (y) = 1y2 (15)
log(1   &0 (y)) = log1 + 2 logy (16)
Hence log(1   &0 (y)) is linear in log labor earnings. This speciﬁcation is similar to the one used by Guvenen
et al. (2009) and is the same as the one in Heathcote et al. (2010b). Both of these papers provide evidence
that one minus the marginal tax rate is approximately log-linear in earnings for the US.
To estimate (1;2) I regress marginal tax rates for each individual in the baseline sample on labor earnings.
Marginal tax rates are calculated using the NBER’s TAXSIM program. The estimated parameter values
are ^ 1 = 0:63768 and ^ 2 =  0:13615 with an R2 of 0:42. I set &0 to the value that equates the actual average
tax rate in the sample (as computed by TAXSIM) to that implied by (14). A regression of the actual tax
liability on the predicted tax liability yields an R2 of 0:96.
F.3 Numerical solution
The model is solved by backward induction using the method of endogenous grid points (Carroll (2006)),
extended to allow for a labor supply decision. The grid for ﬁnancial assets contains 30 points, spaced such
that there are more points closer to the borrowing limit. Policy-rules are approximated with piece-wise linear
functions on this grid. All other state variables are discrete. The three components of the wage process
47are approximated using a discrete-state Markov chain, with an age-varying state. Values and transition
probabilities are chosen to match the age-varying unconditional variance and dependence structure of each
component to that implied by the continuous process. I use 5 points for the ﬁxed eﬀects, 5 points for the
transitory shocks and 11 points for the persistent component. The grid for preference heterogeneity in the
disutility of working contains 3 points. None of the results are sensitive to increasing the size of the grids
in any dimension. Cross-sectional distributions are obtained by simulation with 50;000 simulations at each
age.
For minimization of the simulated method of moments objective function, I use the derivative-free least
squares algorithm of Zhang et al. (2009). This is a trust-region based approach that works by sequentially
building up a series of smooth approximations to each of the moment conditions. It works well with non-
smooth objective functions and requires far fewer function evaluations than other derivative-free algorithms,
such as simplex methods or simulated annealing. However, the algorithm is only guaranteed to converge to
a local minimum. Hence I conduct an extensive search of the parameter space using multiple re-starts of
the algorithm.
G Estimation
G.1 Formal description of estimator
Let  2  denote the K  1 vector of structural parameters to be estimated. I assume that  can be
restricted to a convex and compact subset of RK and that the true parameter 0 lies on the interior of
. Let xit denote the variables that are used to form either a ﬁrst moment or second moment as deﬁned
in appendix B. For ﬁrst moments, xit reﬂects a coeﬃcient on an experience dummy from the ﬁrst stage
regression (or deviation from the coeﬃcient at experience level 3 in the case of consumption data). For
second moments, xit reﬂects the product of a pair of residuals from the ﬁrst stage regression. There are
M > K such transformed variables,
For each x and t, deﬁne the corresponding observation for a simulation r 2 R from the structural model
with parameter vector  as x;t






r ()]  x;t (), the corresponding moment implied by the structural model. The identifying assump-
tion that underlies estimation is
E

xit   x;t ()

= 0 if and only if  = 0:
The simulated method of moments estimator is deﬁned as
^ n = argmaxQn ()
Qn () =  
1
2
^ gn () ^ 
 1
n ^ gn () (17)
where ^ 
n is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix and ^ gn () is an M  1 vector with elements given by
















Provided that R ! 1 at a rate that is faster than (nx;t)
0:25 for all (x;t), simulation error in the calculation
of x;t () does not impact consistency of ^ n, conﬁdence intervals for ^ n or construction of the test of
over-identifying restrictions. With standard assumptions, it is straightforward to show that n ! .





xit   x;t (0)
 
xit   x;t (0)
0i
If ^ 
n is chosen such that ^ 
n ! 
, then one can show that under the null hypothesis that E [xit   x;t (0)] =









































A positive semi-deﬁnite matrix ^ 
n that has this property is the sample variance-covariance matrix of xit.
In estimation I use a diagonal approximation to ^ 
n that sets the oﬀ-diagonal elements to zero.
G.2 Conﬁdence intervals
95% conﬁdence intervals are constructed by bootstrap. Based on arguments in Hall (1986) I use 39 repeti-
tions. The following steps are taken:
1. 39 bootstrap samples are drawn from the PSID and the CEX as described in appendix B.
2. In each bootstrap sample I run the ﬁrst stage regressions, and construct the relevant moments as
described in appendix B.
3. In each bootstrap sample, I re-estimate the parameters that govern the wage process.
4. In each bootstrap sample, I re-estimate the structural parameters by maximizing (17).
5. For each structural parameter the 95% conﬁdence interval is deﬁned by the lowest and highest pa-
rameter estimate across the bootstrap repetitions.
H First order condition with general preference speciﬁcations
H.1 No heterogeneity
I start by considering the case with no cross-sectional heterogeneity in preferences. Consider an agent with
period utility given by u(c;H). The intra-temporal ﬁrst order condition is given by
wituc (cit;Hit) = uH (cit;Hit)
Taking logs followed by a ﬁrst-order Taylor expansion around mean log consumption and mean log hours
at each age yields the following approximation








(log c;log H)=E[(log c;log H)jt]
is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to consumption, evaluated at the age-
speciﬁc mean levels of log consumption and log hours. fH is the corresponding elasticity with respect to
hours worked. gc and gH are the analogous elasticities of the marginal disutility of hours worked.
49Taking cross-sectional variances and ﬁrst diﬀerence of (18) yields a generalized version of equation (3)
(fH   gH)
2 V (logHit) = V (logwit) + (fc   gc)
2 V (logcit)
+2(fc   gc)COV (logcit;logwit) (19)
Inspection of (19) highlights why allowing for more general patterns of complementarity or substitutability
between consumption and hours is unlikely to deliver a declining proﬁle for the variance of hours while
respecting the data on consumption and wages. Given the increasing proﬁle for the variance of wages and
consumption, and a mildly increasing covariance between wages and consumption, the only way to generate
a decrease in the variance of hours is by setting gc >> fc. However, as with the case discussed in Section
6, when gc   fc > 2 there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect through the variance of consumption. Hence the scope for
using this channel is limited.
H.2 Allowing for heterogeneity
If we allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity in the various elasticities (fc;fH;gc;gH), and if we allow the
degree of heterogeneity to vary with age, then it is possible to generate any age proﬁle for the variance of
hours. This was true even in the separable speciﬁcation discussed in Section 6. A problem with pursuing
this approach is that it is diﬃcult to provide a micro-foundation for such age-varying heterogeneity.
However, with heterogeneity only in the relative distaste for work compared with consumption, the argument
in Section 6 carries over to much more general preference speciﬁcations. Here I illustrate this fact with
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preference. For algebraic simplicity I allow preferences to depend





, although the same arguments hold (up to
appropriate approximations) if leisure (1   Hit) were used instead.


















Then the analogous expression to (3) is
( + 1)
2 V (logHit) = V (logwit) + (   1)
2 V (logcit)
 2(   1)COV (logcit;logwit) + 2(   1)COV (logcit;log'i): (20)
It is straightforward to see from (20) that a similar argument applies.
I Parameter estimates with cohort eﬀects
In this appendix I report parameter estimates from the structural model when allowing for cohort eﬀects
rather than year eﬀects in the ﬁrst and second moments. To conserve on space, I do not reproduce the
corresponding ﬁgures that show the ﬁt of the model. These ﬁgures are all available from the author on
request. The parameter estimates that correspond to those in Table 1 are shown in Table 5, while the





































Test of over-identifying restrictions
p-value 0.45 0.00 0.00
Calibrated parameters
 0.988 0.983 0.988
E' 139.6 1809.5 145.6
Targeted moments
E[logc] X X X
E[logh] X X X
V[logc] X
V[logh] X
Table 5: Parameter estimates with cohort eﬀects
Notes: Table shows structural parameter estimates and bootstrap conﬁdence intervals when cohort eﬀects, rather
than year eﬀects, are allowed for in ﬁrst and second moments. Estimated borrowing limit of  10:0 in column 2
reﬂects an estimate on the boundary of the parameter space.




































































Test of over-identifying restrictions
p-value 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00
Calibrated parameters
 0.984 0.983 0.985 0.985
E' 2520.3 2151.5 1916.1 1554.4
Targeted moments
E[logc] X X X X
E[logh] X X X X
V[logc] X X X X




Table 6: Parameter estimates with cohort eﬀects
Notes: Table shows structural parameter estimates and bootstrap conﬁdence intervals when cohort eﬀects, rather
than year eﬀects, are allowed for in ﬁrst and second moments. Estimated borrowing limit of  10:0 in column 2
reﬂects an estimate on the boundary of the parameter space.
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